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DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: 
CONTRACTING FOR VESTED RIGHTS 
BRAD K SCHWARTZ* 
Abstract: The development process is risky for developers. They spend 
large sums of money on various development activities prior to receiving 
a municipality's approval to proceed with the project. Uncertainty exists 
because a municipality may enact a subsequent zoning regulation which 
renders the proposed use impermissible. A vested right protects 
developer investments from subsequent zoning change. This Note 
examines one method by which a developer can obtain a vested right: 
the development agreement. A development agreement is a contract 
between a municipality and a property owner/developer, through which 
the municipality agrees to freeze the existing zoning regulations in 
exchange for public benefits. This Note concludes that development 
agreements are readily enforceable, and are attractive tools in both early 
and late vesting states. 
INTRODUCTION 
The development process begins with a developer's dream. Typi-
cally, the developer then secures capital from lending institutions, 
hires architects and engineers to formulate plans, employs consultants 
to conduct various surveys regarding the characteristics of the land, 
and begins grading and infrastructure installations.1 The developer 
incurs substantial debt, often spending millions of dollars on the early 
development phase.2 Significantly, in late vesting states,3 such activities 
occur prior to the developer receiving the municipality's approval to 
proceed with the project.4 Developers risk their investments hoping 
the municipality will not enact a zoning ordinance which renders a 
* Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2000-01. The 
author is grateful to Jon Witten for his constant guidance during the writing of this Note. 
1 See Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements after Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, 22 URB. LAw. 23, 29 (1990); Interview with Jon Witten, Adjunct Professor of Land Use 
Planning, Boston College Law School (May 16, 2000) [hereinafter Witten Interview J. 
2 See John J. Delaney, Development Agreements Legislation: The Maryland Experience, SB06 
A.L.I.-A.BA 805, 810 (Aug. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Delaney, The Maryland ExperienceJ. 
3 For a definition of late vesting states, see infra notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text. 
4 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809-10. 
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proposed use impermissible.5 The developer is subject to the munici-
pality's discretion and may be left stranded once the initial work and 
financing has been arranged, but before obtaining a vested right to 
develop.6 A development agreement is a solution to the inherent un-
certainty in the development process and a means by which develop-
ers can protect their investment.7 A development agreement is a con-
tract between a municipality and a property owner/developer, which 
provides the developer with vested rights by freezing the existing zon-
ing regulations applicable to a property in exchange for public 
benefits.s 
This Note concludes that development agreements are readily 
enforceable, and are attractive tools in both early and late vesting 
states. Part I of this Note discusses the vested rights principle, includ-
ing its inflexible application in the infamous Avco Community Develop-
ers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission9 decision and recounts the 
risk a developer takes when commencing large development projects. 
Part II introduces development agreements as a solution to strict late 
vesting rules, and highlights the benefits that developers and munici-
palities receive by entering into an agreement. Part III presents devel-
opment agreement legislation as valid contract zoning, and provides a 
comparative overview of common statutory provisions. Part IV focuses 
on the legal issues affecting the enforceability of development agree-
ments. It discusses: (1) express enabling authority; (2) the tension 
between the reserved powers doctrine and the Contracts Clause of the 
United States Constitution, including the influential case, United States 
Trust Co. v. New Jersey;10 (3) the Supreme Court decisions in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commissionll and Dolan v. City of Tigard,12 which de-
veloped the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" require-
ments placed on exactions generally, and asks whether these burdens 
5 See id. 
6 See Bruce M. Kramer, Development Agreements: To What Extent Are They EnJorceabf£?, 10 
REAL EST. L. J. 29, 30 (1981). 
7 See Robert M. Kessler, The Development Agreement and Its Use in Resolving Large Scaf£, 
Multi-Party Development Probkms: A Look at the Tool and Suggestions for its Application, 1 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 456 (1985); Kramer, supra note 6, at 30. 
8 See John J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The !Wad From Prohibition to "Let's Make a 
Deal!," 25 URB. LAW. 49, 52 (1993) [hereinafter Delaney, Developrnent Agreements]; Barry R. 
Knight & Susan P. Schoettle, Current Issues Related to Vested Rights and Developrnent Agreements, 
25 URB. LAw. 779, 787-88 (1993). 
9553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976). 
10 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
11 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
12 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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should be placed on exactions imposed pursuant to development 
agreements; (4) whether a development agreement is a legislative act 
or an administrative act;13 and (5) remedies for noncompliance. Part 
V then applies these legal issues to development agreements, and ex-
plores the utility of development agreements for early vesting states. 
I. VESTED RIGHTS 
A vested right allows development of a proposed use of land to 
proceed even when subsequent changes in zoning regulations render 
the proposed use impermissible. I4 A vested right protects a developer 
from a subsequent zoning change by freezing the existing zoning 
regulations applicable to an approved development, providing a right 
to proceed that cannot be taken away without due process. IS As de-
termined by state law, the right to develop vests at various points of 
the development process.I6 Accordingly, states can be categorized as 
"late vesting" or "early vesting."17 Late vesting states "fail to address 
the realities involved in the approval process for multi-staged large-
scale developments. "18 These types of developments require numer-
ous governmental approvals, such as zoning, subdivision, and site plan 
permitting.19 Costly development activities follow, in direct reliance 
on the governmental approvals. 20 For example, engineering, grading, 
dedications, and infrastructure installation often costs millions of dol-
lars.21 Consultants are hired to conduct surveys regarding water re-
sources, topography, solid and hazardous wastes, wetlands, wildlife, 
transportation, and utilities.22 Architects and engineers are also em-
13 This Note uses the term "administrative act" to refer to both adjudicative (discre-
tional-Y) acts and non-acljudicative (non-discretionary) acts. 
14 See Delaney, The Maryland Expelience, supra note 2, at 807. 
15 See Kramer, supra note 6, at 30. An eminent domain proceeding is an example of 
due process. See id. 
16 See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Scott A. Edelstein, Deuelopment Agreement Practice in Califur-
nia and Other States, 22 STETSON L. REv. 761, 761 (1993). 
17 Kessler, supra note 7, at 452. 
18 Delaney, The Maryland Expelience, supra note 2, at 809. 
19 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southern Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 549 
(Cal. 1976) (Avco obtained zoning change, tentative and final subdivision map approval, 
rough gl-ading permit, as well as approvals for constructing storm drains, culverts, street 
improvements, utilities, and similar facilities); Delaney, The Maryland Expelience, supra note 
2, at 809-10. 
20 See Delaney, The Maryland Expelience, supra note 2, at 809-10. 
21 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549 (stating Avco spent $2,082,070 and incurred liabilities of 
$740,468); Delaney, The Maryland Expetience, sujJra note 2, at 809-10. 
22 See Crew, supra note 1, at 29; ",Titten Interview, supra note 1. 
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ployed to formulate the plans, requiring the expenditures of a con-
siderable amount of money.23 Importantly, in late vesting states, these 
costly development activities occur prior to the issuance of the build-
ing permit.24 As a result, after spending a large sum of money on vari-
ous development activities, developers undertaking large projects in 
late vesting states face a great deal of uncertainty as they risk being 
without a remedy in the event of a sudden change in the zoning regu-
lations.25 "The lack of certainty in the development approval process 
can result in a waste of resources, escalate the cost of housing and 
other development to the consumer, and discourage investment in 
and commitment to comprehensive planning. "26 
A vested right puts such uncertainty to rest. 27 The underlying ra-
tionale of the vested rights doctrine is the principle of equitable es-
toppel.28 In short, at some point in the development process, the mu-
nicipality should be estopped from changing those zoning regulations 
that would prohibit the completion of the project or diminish the re-
turn on the developer's investment.29 This point occurs when a devel-
oper has made a substantial change in position by incurring extensive 
obligations and expenses in good faith reliance on a governmental act 
such as an issued permit or authorization to commence develop-
ment.30 State law defines the precise point at which the right to de-
velop vests, and state courts have applied two different rules: (1) the 
"last discretionary approval" rule; and (2) the "building permit" 
rule.31 
23 See Crew, supra note 1, at 29; Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
24 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 809-10. 
25 See id. 
26 HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-121 (1996). In addition, the lack of certainty in the develop-
ment process can cause higher interest rates on loans and increase costs due to vested 
rights litigation. See Crew, supra note 1, at 29. 
27 See Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 788. 
28 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southern Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546,551 
(Cal. 1976); Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 781. 
29 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 763-64. 
30 See Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of Honolulu, 606 P.2d 866, 902 (Haw. 
1980); see also Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 807 ("The black-letter test 
for acquisition of vested rights is that a landowner will be protected when: (1) relying in 
good faith, (2) upon some act or omission of tile government, (3) he has made substantial 
expenditures or otherwise committed himself to his substantial disadvantage prior to a 
zoning change."). see generally Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 781-84 (summarizing 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel). 
31 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 764. 
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A. The Last Discretionary Approval Rule 
Under the last discretionary approval rule, a developer obtains a 
vested right to complete a substantially commenced project upon 
aquiring the last discretionary approval necessary to complete the de-
velopment.32 This rule is lenient in some states and strict in others.33 
In Oregon, a state with a lenient version of the rule, the last discre-
tionary approval may occur prior to a final approval involving discre-
tion so long as the approval is based on a sufficiently defined pro-
posa1.34 In Milcrest Corp. v. Clackamas County, a developer obtained a 
vested right to develop a 440-acre nonconforming planned unit de-
velopment based on preliminary subdivision plat approval, even 
though a revised proposal including an additional 220 acres was later 
approved. 35 
Hawaii, on the other hand, strictly applies the last discretionary 
approval rule.36 In County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance Co., 
a developer purchased shoreline property and sought to develop 
condominium units and a hoteJ.37 The Hawaii Supreme Court held 
that the last discretionary approval was the holding of a referendum 
on the applicable resort zoning ordinance.38 The court reasoned that 
the referendum petition was certified prior to the planning commis-
sion granting a Special Management Area use permit, ordinarily the 
32 See Milcrest Corp. v. Clackamas County, 650 P.2d 963, 966-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); 
Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 764. Discretionary approvals include "special" or 
"conditional" use permits, and variances, but do not include building permits. See WILLIAM 
D. VALENTE & DAVID]. MCCARTHY,JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 547-48 (1992); Building 
Permits, in ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS ch. 48, at 32 (2000). Special use permits are 
authorized by the zoning ordinance, and granted or denied upon the discretion of the 
empowered adjudicatory board pursuant to express standards and criteria, often following 
negotiations between the developer and the board. See VALENTE & MCCARTHY, supra, at 
547. Variances are not permitted by the zoning ordinance, but nevertheless are granted 
when, in the adjudicatory board's discretion, a unique hardship exists and a strict applica-
tion of the zoning ordinance would be unconstitutional. See id. at 548. A building permit. 
however, does not constitute a discretionary approval; it is a permit by right as it must be 
issued so long as the developer fully complies with all of the applicable laws (e.g., zoning 
regulations, and building, health, fire, and housing codes). See Building Permits, supra, at 
32. 
33 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 764. 
34 See Milcrest Corp., 650 P.2d at 965-66; see also Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 765 
(summarizing Milcrest Corp.). 
35 See Milcrest Corp., 650 P.2d at 965-67; see also Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 
765. 
36 See County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins., 653 P.2d 766, 776 (Haw. 1982); see 
also Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 765 (summarizing County ofKaUal). 
37 See County of Kaltai, 653 P.2d at 770. 
38 See id. at 776. 
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final discretionary action for vested rights. 39 Certification under these 
circumstances enabled the voters to exercise their discretion regard-
ing the proposed resort.40 Consequently, the developer could not rely 
in good faith on the permit approval; rather, he could rely only on 
assurance from the voters.41 The electorate, however, approved the 
referendum to repeal the resort zoning ordinance.42 Thus, the devel-
opers did not obtain a vested right to develop and lost the 
$3,532,897.23 spent on the project following permit approval.43 
B. The Building Permit Rule 
Under the building permit rule, if a municipality changes its land 
use regulations, "a property owner cannot claim a vested right to 
build out a project unless he has obtained a building permit and per-
formed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities in good 
faith reliance upon the permit."44 In Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. 
South Coast Regional Commission, the California Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this common law vested rights rule in California: 
It has long been the rule in this state and in other jurisdic-
tions that if a property owner has performed substantial 
work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reli-
ance upon a permit issued by the government, he acquires a 
vested right to complete construction in accordance with the 
terms of the permit. Once a landowner has secured a vested 
right the government may not, by virtue of a change in the 
zoning laws, prohibit construction authorized by the permit 
upon which he relied.45 
The Avco court further stated that "neither the existence of a par-
ticular zoning nor work undertaken pursuant to governmental ap-
provals preparatory to construction of buildings can form the basis of 
39 See id. at 775-76. "Certification" refers to the county clerk attesting to the sufficiency 
of the refe1'endum petition under the pertinent charter provisions, including, for example, 
a provision requiring that a certain number of signatures be obtained. See id. at 770. 
40 See id. at 775-76. 
41 See id. at 776. 
42 See County of Kauai, 653 P.2d at 776, 771. 
43 See id. at 776, 777 n.15, 779. 
44 DANIEL]. CURTIN,JR., CURTIN'S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAw 177-78 
(19th ed. 1999). The ensuing presentation of the Avco decision follows the structure of Mr. 
Curtin's summary of vested rights and the Avco rule. See id. 
45 Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southern Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 550 
(Cal. 1976) (citations omitted); see all'oCurtin, supra note 44, at 177. 
2001] Develvpment Agreements 725 
a vested right to build a structure which does not comply with the laws 
applicable at the time a building permit is issued. "46 
Plaintiff Avco owned 7,936 acres of land in Orange County, part 
of which was located within a coastal zone.47 Prior to February 1, 
1973, when the coastal zoning permit requirement became effective, 
Avco had obtained a zoning change as well as tentative and final sub-
division map approva1.48 Pursuant to approvals issued by the county, 
Avco had finished or was in the process of constructing storm drains, 
improvements of utilities, and other similar facilities for the tract.49 
Significantly, Avco had not yet received a building permit.50 Avco had 
spent approximately $2 million and incurred liabilities of $740,468 
for development of the tract.51 Avco claimed that it had a vested right 
to develop, and that it should be exempt from the coastal zoning 
permit requirement because it had received final discretionary ap-
proval and incurred substantial expenses in reliance on county 
au thorizations. 52 
The California Supreme Court held that Avco did not have a 
vested right to proceed because it failed to meet the vested rights 
common law rule that a property owner has a vested right only if he 
performs substantial work in good faith reliance on a building per-
mit.53 The court stated that "[b]y zoning the property or issuing ap-
provals for work preliminary to construction the government makes 
no representation to a landowner that he will be exempt from the 
zoning laws in effect at the subsequent time he applies for a building 
permit .... "54 Therefore, the government could not be estopped 
from enforcing the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, 
a law in effect at the time Avco would have applied for a building 
permit.55 The court reasoned that a developer must comply with the 
laws in effect at the time a building permit is issued to prevent "seri-
46 Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177. 
47 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 548-49; see aLm Curtin, supra note 44, at 177. 
48 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177-78. 
49 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 177-78. 
50 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178. 
51 See Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. Southem Coast Reg') Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 549 
(Cal. 1976); see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178. 
52 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 549-50, 552; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178. 
53 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, wpra note 44, at )78. 
54 Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, supra note 44, at 178. 
55 See Avco, 553 P.2d at 551; see also Curtin, wpra note 44, at 178. 
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ous impairment of the government's right to control land use pol-
icy."56 
II. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
Hawaii and California enacted development agreement legisla-
tion to mitigate the effects of the states' supreme court decisions in 
County of Kauai and Avco, which applied strict late vesting rules and 
thus disregarded the developers' expectations in complex, multi-stage 
projects.57 A development agreement is a contract between a munici-
pality and a property owner/developer, executed as part of the devel-
opment approval process.58 The municipality promises not to change 
the planning and zoning regulations applicable to the property in ex-
change for the developer's promise to abide by a defined set of condi-
tions restricting the use of the property, and requiring a contribute 
land, public facilities, and/or money. 59 In City of West Hollywood v. Bev-
erly Towers,60 the California Supreme Court stated: 
[D]evelopment agreements between a developer and a local 
government limit the power of that government to apply 
newly enacted ordinances to ongoing developments. Unless 
otherwise provided in the agreement, the rules, regulations, 
and official policies governing permitted uses, density, de-
sign, improvement, and construction are those in effect 
when the agreement is executed .... The purpose of ... the 
development agreement is to allow a developer who needs 
additional discretionary approvals to complete a long-term 
development project as approved, regardless of any interven-
ing changes in local regulations.61 
A development agreement extends benefits to both the devel-
oper and the municipality.62 For the developer, the most important 
advantage is the settling of the uncertainty surrounding vested 
56 Avco, 553 P.2d at 554; see also CUrlin, supra note 44, at 178. 
57 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5 (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 46--121 to -132 
(1996); see Curtin, supra note 44, at 181; Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargain-
ing Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Govem-
rnent Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REv. 957, 1000 n.253, 1007 (1987). 
58 See Delaney, Development Agreements, supra note 8, at 52. 
59 See Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 787-88. 
60 805 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1991). 
61 See id. at 334 n.6, 334-35 (1991) (citations omitted). 
62 See Theodore C. Tauh, Development Agreements, C629 A.L.L-A.B.A. 555, 558 (1991). 
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rights.63 The development agreement affords contractual vested rights 
by providing a "freeze period" during which conflicting laws and regu-
lations enacted after project approval will not affect the approved de-
velopment.64 As a result, the developer's investment is protected from 
a subsequent zoning change that may jeopardize a long-term devel-
opment project.65 Moreover, developers can "bargain for support in 
the permitting process, including some assurance that if they concede 
certain public benefits, reviewing agencies will generally grant permit 
approvals in the shortest period of time possible. "66 
For the municipality, the development agreement provides cer-
tainty that public facilities and infrastructure necessary to support 
new growth will be built without delay.67 Significantly, development 
agreements arguably allow municipalities to exact public benefits in 
excess of what would otherwise be permitted by "regulatory takings" 
rules.68 In addition, a municipality may achieve adequate comprehen-
sive planning.69 Ordinarily, the lack of certainty in the development 
process damages municipalities through lengthy and costly litigation 
and administrative hearings regarding vested rights. 70 Such disputes 
divert municipal staff energies and public money from more produc-
tive planning efforts, deter development, slow the growth of the tax 
base, and interfere with the planning and development of public fa-
cilities.71 Through the use of development agreements, however, mu-
nicipalities can efficiently achieve long-range comprehensive plan-
63 See Crew, supra note I, at 29. 
64 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 812. This "freeze period" is sub-
ject to certain exceptions. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
65 See Taub, supra note 62, at 559. 
66 MODEL DEV. AGREEMENT BYLAW § 04.0 (Cape Cod Commission 1990), available at 
<http://www.capecodcommission.org/bylaws/ develagree.html> (visited May 17, 2000). 
In 1990, Massachusetts enacted the Cape Cod Commission Act which established the Cape 
Cod Commission as a regional planning and land use agency for Cape Cod. Cape Cod 
Commission <http://www.capecodcommission.org> (visited Aug. 4, 2000). The Model 
Development Agreement Bylaw referred to here ''was prepared by the Cape Cod Commis-
sion to assist Cape Cod Towns that wish to incorporate development agreement authority 
into their local regulations." MODEL DEV. AGREEMENT BYLAW (Background). While recog-
nizing that the Cape Cod Commission permits the use of development agreements, this 
Note focuses primarily on state statutes. 
67 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 811. 
68 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 782. For a discussion on whether the mu-
nicipality can negotiate for exactions beyond what it could reasonably require under the 
normal exercise of its police power, see infi'a Parts IVC, V.A.3. 
69 See Crew, supra note I, at 30-31. 
70 See id. at 29. 
71 See Crew, supra.note I, at 30; Knight & Schoettle, supra note 8, at 788-89. 
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ning goals (e.g., open space conservation, water and air quality pro-
tection, environmental mitigation, and affordable housing), avoid or 
reduce costly litigation and administrative proceedings, tailor regula-
tions to the unique needs of individual projects and communities, 
and decrease the cost of development to the public as developers will 
no longer have high interest rates to pass on to consumers.72 In light 
of the benefits to both developers and municipalities, development 
agreements are an attractive tool in late vesting states.73 
III. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT LEGISLATION AS VALID 
CONTRACT ZONING 
A. Contract Zoning 
Contract zoning refers to an ad hoc agreement between a mu-
nicipality and a developer regarding rezoning.74 In the traditional 
view, contract zoning is per se invalid, but courts are increasingly re-
jecting this approach and upholding certain forms of contract zon-
ing.7S Specifically, courts distinguish between bilateral and unilateral 
contracts.76 A bilateral contract in which a municipality promises to 
rezone property is illegal because the municipality bypasses the notice 
and hearing phases of the legislative process, thereby depriving inter-
ested parties of due process.77 On the other hand, a unilateral con-
tract in which a developer makes a promise contingent on the munici-
pality's act of rezoning is legal. Because the municipality does not 
promise to take action prior to the zoning hearing, it does not cir-
cumvent the legislative process. 78 In short, contract zoning is illegal 
72 See Crew, supra note 1, at 30-31; Knight & Schoettle, supm note 8, at 788-89. 
73 See Crew, supra note 1, at 31; Kessler, supm note 7, at 455. 
74 See Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supm note 2, at 812. 
75 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 982-85, 987; compare Rando v. Town of N. Attlebor-
ough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 548, 549 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (citing Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 
845 P.2d 793, 797-98 (N.M. 1992) as persuasive authority for upholding a payment prom-
ised by the developer rather than required by the municipality), and Old Canton Hills 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor and City Council of Jackson, 749 So. 2d 54, 58, 60 (Miss. 
1999) (l-elying on Dacy to uphold contingent zoning), with Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797-98 (strik-
ing down unilateral contract zoning because the Village attempted to zone without follow-
ing the statutory process). 
76 See Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797-98; Wegner, supra note 57, at 987 ("It is much more likely 
that a unilateral promise, which the landowner makes contingent, of course, on the rezon-
ing's becoming effective, would pass legal muster, than a bilateral promise in which the 
local government also agl'ees to take action, most probably to rezone."). 
77 See Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797. 
78 See id. at 797-98. 
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whenever it arises from a promise by a municipality to zone property 
in a certain manner, whether in a bilateral contract or unilateral con-
tract initiated by the municipality.79 
Development agreements take the form of bilateral contracts as 
the municipality and the developer exchange promises.so As such, ab-
sent legislative authority, development agreements constitute illegal 
contract zoning.s1 It is of critical legal consequence, therefore, that 
development agreements are entered into pursuant to express ena-
bling legislation. S2 Thus recognizing the central importance of devel-
opment agreement legislation, it is worth noting the basic provisions 
found in a typical development agreement statute.S3 
B. Common Development Agreement Statutory Provisions 
In 1979, California became the first state to pass legislation ena-
bling municipalities to enter into development agreements.S4 In 1985, 
Hawaii, following California's law as an example, became the second 
state to pass such legislation. S5 Currently, ten states have enacted de-
velopment agreement legislation.s6 
Most statutes identify the public purposes and goals of a devel-
opment agreement.S7 For example, the legislative findings and decla-
rations in California's statute acknowledge the statute's purpose is to 
bring increased "certainty" and "assurance" to the development proc-
ess.ss "Certainty" and "assurance" are expected to "strengthen the 
public planning process, encourage private participation in compre-
hensive planning, and reduce the economic costs of development. "S9 
Likewise, the legislative findings and declarations in Hawaii's statute 
79 See id. at 797. 
80 SeeE. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 47 (3d ed. 1999). 
81 See David A. Callies, DeveWpment Agreements, in ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS ch. 
9A, at 12, 17 (2000); Delaney, The Maryland Expel"ience, supra note 2, at 812. 
82 See Callies, supra note 81, at 17. 
83 The following comparative overview examines only those development agreement 
statutes enacted in California, Florida, Hawaii, and Nevada. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65864-
65869.5 (1997); FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3220-.3243 (2000); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 46-121 to -132 
(1996); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 278.0201-.0205 (1997). 
84 See Curtin, supra note 44, at 181. 
85 See Curtin & Edelstein, supra note 16, at 777-78. 
86 See Callies, supra note 81, at 17 (listing the ten states as follows: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, and New Jersey); DANIEL 
P. SELMI &JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 487 (1999). 
87 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65864; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-121. 
88 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65864. 
89 [d. 
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points to "predictability," "public benefits," and the "vesting of devel-
opment rights" as solutions to the problems caused by the "lack of 
certainty" in the development process.90 
Generally, the statutes mandate that a development agreement 
must specify certain substantive terms.91 For example, the statutes in 
California, Hawaii, Florida, and Nevada all provide that a develop-
ment agreement shall include a description of the land subject to the 
agreement, the permitted uses of the property (including density, in-
tensity, and the maximum height and size of the proposed buildings), 
provisions for reservation or dedication of land for public purposes, 
and the duration of the agreement.92 Florida imposes a ten year 
maximum duration on development agreements, although they may 
be extended by mutual agreement of the parties following a public 
hearing.93 In addition, the statutes in California, Hawaii, Florida, and 
Nevada provide that a development agreement may include com-
mencement dates and completion dates for construction.94 
Ordinarily, mutual consent is needed to amend or cancel the 
agreement, in whole or in part.95 In Hawaii, however, if the county 
determines that a proposed amendment would "substantially alter" 
the original agreement, a public hearing must be held.96 In addition, 
development agreement statutes allow the municipality to amend or 
cancel the agreement upon the developer's breach of the agree-
ment.97 In Hawaii, the developer must be given notice and a reason-
able opportunity to cure the breach.98 Finally, an agreement may be 
cancelled when doing so is essential to ensure public health, safety, or 
welfare.99 
There are seven additional provisions worth noting. First, the 
most appealing aspect of a development agreement is that unless oth-
erwise provided in the agreement, the applicable rules, regulations, 
and policies are those which are "in force at the time of the execution 
90 HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-121. 
91 SeeTaub, supra note 62, at 560. 
92 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.2; FLA. STAT. § 163.3227 (2000); HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-
126; NEV. REv. STAT. § 278.0201 (1997). 
93 FLA. STAT. § 163.3229. 
94 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.2; FLA. STAT. § 163.3227; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-126; 
NEV. REv. STAT. § 278.0201. 
95 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65868; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-130. 
96 HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-130. 
97 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.1; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-125. 
98 See HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-125. 
99 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.3; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-127. 
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of the agreement. "100 Each state allows for varying exceptions to this 
"freeze period," allowing the municipality to apply newly enacted laws 
which are, for example, essential to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare, or, not in conflict with those rules applicable to the property.lOl 
Second, an enabling statute is not always sufficient to grant a munici-
pality the authority to enter into a development agreement.l02 In Cali-
fornia and Hawaii, for example, a municipality must first pass an ena-
bling ordinance establishing the details of development agreement 
"procedures and requirements" that the executive branch of the 
county must follow.l°3 Third, under California law, the adoption of a 
development agreement is a "legislative" act subject to "referen-
dum. "104 The Hawaii statute, in contrast, declares that the adoption of 
a development agreement is an "administrative" decision which is not, 
therefore, subject to referendum.105 Fourth, the California statute re-
quires that the municipality annually review compliance with the 
agreement, and authorizes the municipality to "terminate or modify 
the agreement" upon a finding of noncompliance. l06 The Nevada 
statute, in comparison, requires periodic review only once every two 
years.107 Fifth, the statutes in California, Hawaii, and Florida provide 
that a development agreement is enforceable by "any party" to the 
contract. !Os Sixth, development agreement statutes require the hold-
ing of a "public hearing" prior to the adoption of a development 
agreement. loo The California and Florida statutes require that "no-
tice" be given to all affected property owners.no And seventh, all stat-
100 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65866; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-127. 
101 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65865.3, 65866; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-127. 
102 See Callies, supra note 81, at 17. 
103 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-123. 
104 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5. The policy behind this rule is to guard against a lame 
duck city council approving a development agreement opposed by the public. See Wegner, 
supra note 57, at 1013. There is a possibility, however, that the California courts may char-
acterize the adoption of a development agreement as an administrative act, even though 
the legislature has determined otherwise. See id. 
105 See HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-131. V\'hen including this provision in the Hawaii statute, 
the legislature may have been heavily influenced by County oj Kauai, where the outcome of 
a voter referendum caused the developer to lose a large sum of money. See V\'egner, supra 
note 57, at 1013 n.319; supra Part l.A. 
106 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865.1. 
107 See NEV. REv. STAT. § 278.0205 (1997). 
108 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.4; FLA. STAT. § 163.3243 (2000); HAW. REv. STAT. § 
46-127. 
109 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-128. 
llO See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867; FLA. STAT. § 163.3225. 
732 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:719 
utes declare that a project proposed by a development agreement 
must be "consistent with the general plan."lll 
In short, development agreement legislation has rescued devel-
opment agreements from being held invalid as illegal contract zon-
ing. ll2 The standards described above illustrate the common provi-
sions contained in a typical development agreement statute. l13 With 
this basic understanding of how to draft a development agreement in 
mind, appreciation of legal issues which affect its enforceability is 
more readily achieved. 
IV. LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
This section discusses five distinct legal issues which affect the 
enforceability of a development agreement. First, as a threshold issue, 
a municipality must have express enabling authority to enter into a 
development agreement. The second issue focuses on the tension be-
tween the reserved powers doctrine and the Contracts Clause, and the 
third issue examines whether rules used during adjudicative takings 
should apply to exactions imposed pursuant to devevlopment agree-
ments. The fourth issue considered is the significance of characteriz-
ing a development agreement as a legislative act or an administrative 
act. And finally, the fifth issue reviewed is remedies available to both 
the municipality and the developer in the event of noncompliance. 
A. Express Enabling Authority 
Municipalities may exercise only those powers expressly granted 
to them by the state.1l4 A municipality, therefore, must have express 
III See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-129. The general plan, 
also known as the "comprehensive plan," contains the municipality's land use policies and 
thus serves as a guideline for the legislature when drafting zoning ordinances. See Compre-
hensive Pwn, in ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS ch. 37, at 4-9 (2000). The rule is that 
zoning must be "in accordance" with the comprehensive plan. See id. at 4. 
112 See Callies, supra note 81, at 12, 17; Delaney, The Maryland Experience, supra note 2, at 
812. 
113 See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65864-65869.5; FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3220-.3243; HAW. REv. 
STAT. §§ 46-121 to -132; NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 278.0201-.0205 (1997); see also Callies, supra 
note 81, at 12-30 (providing a comparative review of state legislation); Taub, supra note 62, 
at 559-64 (same); Wegner, supra note 57, at 996-99 (same). 
114 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 469. Municipalities are creatures of the states and there-
fore lack inherent power. See VALENTE & MCCARTHY, JR., supra note 32, at 46. Accordingly, 
Dillon's Rule holds that municipalities, dependent upon the state, possess only such pow-
ers as are expressly granted, those that are necessarily or fairly implied from express pow-
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statutory authority to impose exactions as part of its regulatory per-
mitting process.1l5 Likewise, a municipality must have express ena-
bling authority to enter into development agreements, through which 
municipalities negotiate exactions.1l6 Otherwise, without the requisite 
authority, an agreement will be declared void as ultra vires.ll7 Some 
states, however, require the municipality to pass an enabling ordi-
nance setting out the details of development agreement procedures 
and requirements prior to entering into an agreement.1l8 The ena-
bling ordinance ensures that exactions negotiated through develop-
ment agreements are not arbitrary and capricious.1l9 
In Nunziato v. Planning Board of Edgewater, the planning board ap-
proved a site plan for the construction of a high rise condominium 
apartment building, conditioned upon the developer's agreement to 
ers, and those essential to the municipality's corporate status. See id. at 63 (citations omit-
ted). Dillon's Rule requires strict construction of delegated powers to municipalities. See id. 
at 63-64. Home Rule provisions, however, have recognized local autonomy over matters of 
local concern and supports liberal construction of delegated powers, eroding the effects of 
Dillon's Rule. See id. at 63, 110. State law determines whether the state adheres to Dillon's 
Rule or Home Rule. See id. at 110-11. In a Dillon's Rule state, the authority to enter into 
development agreements must be expressly granted. See id. at 63. While it seems to follow 
that in a Home Rule state such authority may be derived from the broad power to govern 
local matters like zoning, there are some limits placed upon Home Rule which preclude 
reaching this conclusion. See Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118, 
124-26 (Mass. 1962) (Kirk, J., dissenting); Witten Interview, supra note 1. For instance, 
contract zoning is often prohibited by the legislature as an invalid method of imposing 
restrictions on the use of land. See Sylvania, 183 N.E.2d at 124-26 (Kirk, J., dissenting). 
Thus, even in a Home Rule state, the authority to enter into development agreements 
must be expressly granted to save an agreement from being held invalid as illegal contract 
zoning. See id.; Callies, supra note 81, at 12, 17; Delaney, The Marylnnd Expetience, supra note 
2, at 812. 
115 See Delaney, Development Agreetnents, supra note 8, at 53. 
116 See id. at 55. In Giger v. City of Omaha, however, the conrt upheld a development 
agreement even though the City of Omaha did not have express statutory authority to 
enter into such agreements. See 442 N.W.2d 182, 193 (Neb. 1989). The court found implied 
authority to implement conditional zoning in the city's "broad powers to regulate land 
uses as long as those regulations are within the police power." [d. The court concluded that 
the conditions imposed through conditional rezoning were within the proper exercise of 
the police power as they were "in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and the gen-
eral welfare." [d. at 190, 193. Despite this anomalous case where a court found implied 
authority to enter into development agreements, express authority is preferred because it 
resolves the contract zoning issue and is better able to withstand reserved powers doctrine 
and ultra vires challenges. See Callies, supra note 81, at 17; Delaney, The Maryland Expmence, 
supra note 2, at 812; Kessler, supra note 7, at 469-70. 
117 See Delaney, Development Agreetnents, supra note 8, at 55. 
118 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865 (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-123 (1996). 
119 See Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater, 541 A.2d 1105, 1110 (NJ. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1988). 
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pay $203,000 to the borough for its affordable housing fund. 120 The 
court held that the planning board's approval was arbitrary and ca-
pricious, and vacated the approval.121 The court explained that such 
"impositions must be authorized by statute and implemented by mu-
nicipal ordinance. "122 In Nunziato, the municipal body failed to enact 
an enabling ordinance and thus the money constituted an impermis-
sible exaction.123 The court reasoned that "[w]ithout [an ordinance 
establishing] legislated standards the possibilities for abuse in such 
negotiations between an applicant and a regulatory body ... are un-
limited. "124 Assuming that a municipality has the requisite authority, 
the development agreement may then face other legal issues. 
B. The Reserved Powers Doctrine and the Contracts Clause 
l. The Reserved Powers Doctrine 
"[T] he legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a 
State."125 Thus, a current legislature cannot use its contract power to 
bind future legislatures and limit their discretion in exercising the 
police power.126 Known as the reserved powers doctrine, this rule re-
quires a determination as to whether a municipality, upon entering 
into a development agreement, impermissibly bargains away its police 
power when it promises not to change the land use regulations appli-
cable to the developer's property.127 If a development agreement is 
found to bargain away the police power, it fails under the rule of "ini-
120 See id. at 11 06, 11 08. 
121 Seeid. at 1109-10. 
122 Id. at 1108. 
123 See id. at 1109. 
124Id. at 1110. Nine years later, in Swanson v. Planning Bd. of Hopewell, Judge Stein wrote 
a concurring opinion reflecting his concern about unlawful exactions, even though the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits as the 
statute oflimitations had expired. See 692 A.2d 966, 96(Hj7 (NJ. 1997). Pointing in part to 
the Appellate Division's reasoning in Nunziato, Judge Stein emphasized that exactions are 
lawful only when imposed pursuant to standards set forth by an enabling ordinance. See id. 
at 970. 
125 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880). 
126 See Callies, supra note 81, at 7,10. 
127 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977) ("This doctrine re-
quires a determination of the State's power to create irrevocable contract rights in the first 
place, rather than an inquiry into the purpose or reasonableness of the subsequent im-
pairment."); see also Wegner, supra note 57, at 965 n.31 (clarifYing the common misuse of 
the phrase "reserved powers doctrine"). 
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tial incapacity" and is void ab initio.128 Otherwise, a development 
agreement is a valid and enforceable contract.129 
In deciding whether a government contract is void ab initio under 
the reserved powers doctrine, the test is whether an essential attribute 
of state power has been contracted away.130 To violate the reserved 
powers doctrine, a police power, such as zoning, must be contracted 
away in its entirety for a long period of time.l3l This Note proceeds 
assuming that municipalities do not violate the reserved powers doc-
trine upon entering into development agreements and that such con-
tracts will be held enforceable.132 
2. The Contracts Clause 
The crucial problem surfaces as soon as a municipality enacts a 
new zoning ordinance that impairs a valid development agreement.133 
The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution provides that 
"[n]o state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts. "134 Accordingly, a Contracts Clause claim may be brought 
when a state allegedly uses its legislative authority to impair an en-
forceable contract.135 The framers drafted this clause to "encourage 
trade and credit by promoting confidence in the stability of contrac-
tual obligations."136 This rationale provides sufficient reason to pro-
128 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23; Wegner, supra note 57, at 965 n.3!. 
129 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23; Wegner, supra note 57, at 965 n.3!. 
130 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 23-24; Kessler, supra note 7, at 465. 
131 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926) (holding 
that zoning is a legitimate exercise of state police power); Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of 
Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 734 (1976) ("The effect of the [reserved powers] rule, 
however, is to void only a contract which amounts to a city's 'surrender,' or 'abnegation,' of 
its control of a properly municipal function."); Callies, supra note 81, at 7. 
132 See infra Part V.A.I (whether municipalities violate the reserved powers doctrine 
upon entering into development agreements). 
133 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 465. Undoubtedly, a municipality is free to adopt such 
an ordinance without applying it to the property subject to the development agreement. 
The basis for the "crucial problem" discussed throughout this Note, therefore, lies in the 
improbable situation where the municipality, for some reason, seeks to apply the newly 
enacted ordinance and nullify the development agreement. This will occur, for instance, 
when the municipality enacts a law invoking the public health, safety, or welfare exception 
to the regulatory f1'eeze. See id. 
134 U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. I. 
135 See E. & E. Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 678-81 (7th Cir. 
1980) (holding that a Contracts Clause claim existed when the District used its legislative 
authority to prevent the plaintiff from fulfilling its contractual obligation while providing 
itself with a defense to a suit for damages). 
136 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I, 15 (1977). 
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tect developers in development agreements.I37 In addition, the Con-
tracts Clause applies to public contracts, such as development agree-
ments between a government entity and a private party.I3S Unques-
tionably, the Contracts Clause requires a municipality to "keep its 
word" and implement the regulatory freeze once it enters into a de-
velopment agreement.139 The reserved powers doctrine, however, 
prohibits a municipality from contracting away its zoning power.140 In 
short, the tension between these two provisions creates a problem 
when, after creating vested rights through an enforceable develop-
ment agreement, the municipality enacts a new zoning ordinance 
which renders the approved development impermissible.141 
a. Impairment oj Contract Compared with Breach oj Contract 
While the reserved powers doctrine prohibits the contracting 
away of the police power, if the Contracts Clause is to have any mean-
ing it must place some limit on the exercise of police power,142 The 
United States Constitution, therefore, only prohibits impairment of 
contract; it does not prohibit a mere breach of contract.143 "A gov-
ernmental action becomes an impairment if a government acts in a 
way which makes performance of the contract illegal or impossible 
and thus gives the party defaulting on its obligation a defense to a 
breach of contract action for damages or other relief. "144 Hence, 
when distinguishing between breach of contract and impairment of 
contract, the court's central inquiry focuses on remedies: when an 
adequate remedy in damages exists, government action is character-
ized as a breach of contract that does not rise to the level of a contrac-
tual impairment.145 When the government action consists of passing a 
137 See Donald G. Hagman, Development Agreements, in 1982 ZONING & PLAN. L. HAND-
BOOK 189 (Fredric A. Strom ed. 1982). 
138 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 9-10 (covenant between Port Authority bond-
holders and the states of New York and New Jersey). 
139 Hagman, supra note 137, at 189. 
140 See supra Part IV.B.l. 
141 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 465. 
142 See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978). 
143 See E. & E. Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(explaining how to determine whether a legislative act is an impairment of contract or a 
mere breach of contract); Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35-37; 
Wegner, supra note 57, at 968. 
1-14 Hagman, supm note 137, at 189; see E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679; Kramer, supra 
note 6, at 35-37. 
145 See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679 ("The distinction [between a breach of a con-
tract and impairment of the obligation of the contract] depends on the availability of a 
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law, an adequate remedy in damages generally does not exist because 
the law will be a sufficient defense, making it illegal or impossible for 
the defaulting party to fulfill its contractual obligation.146 
Whether the government action amounts to an impairment of 
contract or a breach of contract affects the developer's potential rem-
edy.147 If the government action is merely a breach of contract, reme-
dies such as damages, restitution, and specific performance are avail-
able to the private party.148 When the government action constitutes a 
contractual impairment, however, the focus turns to whether the gov-
ernment is justified in breaking its contractual obligations.149 
b. Justification of an Impairment of Contract 
As a threshold, a governmental action must operate as a "substan-
tial impairment" of a contractual relationship.150 An impairment of 
contract may be justified and found constitutional if it is "reasonable 
and necessary" to serve an important public purpose.151 The test formu-
lated in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey requires a balancing of the 
state's interest in the exercise of its police power against the degree of 
impairment of the private party's contractual expectations.152 Factors 
considered include whether the private party heavily and reasonably 
relied on the contractual expectations, whether changed circum-
stances and unforeseen events led to the new law, and whether an al-
ternative exists.153 "In applying this [strict scrutiny] standard [to pub-
lic contracts], however, complete deference to a legislative assessment 
of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's 
self-interest is at stake. "154 
remedy in damages in response to the state's ... action.") (citing Hays v. Port of Seattle, 
251 U.S. 233, 237 (1920»; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35-37; 
Wegner, supra note 57, at 970. 
146 SeeE. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679-80; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189. 
147 See Hagman, supra note 137, at 187; Wegner, supra note 57, at 971. 
148 See Hagman, supra note 137, at 187. For a discussion on remedies for hl'each of con-
tract, see infra Part IV.E.2.b. 
149 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036. 
150 See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978). 
151 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I, 25 (1977) (emphasis added). 
152 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28-32; Wegner, supra note 57, at 974-75. One 
year later, in Allied Steel, the Court reaffirmed the test set forth in United States Trust. See 
Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 244-47. 
153 See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 244-50; United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 28-32; see also 
Hagman, supra note 137, at 191 (listing the factors); Wegner, supra note 57, at 974-75 (dis-
cussing the balancing approach used by the Supreme Court). 
154 United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-26. 
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In United States Trust, the Supreme Court invalidated New Jersey's 
repeal of covenants which limited the use of Port Authority reve-
nues. 155 The Court conducted a balancing test and reasoned that al-
though the concern about mass transportation was legitimate, it did 
not outweigh the bondholders contractual expectations that their se-
curity interest would be preserved.156 Significantly, in holding the re-
peal unnecessary and unreasonable, the Court found that the state 
could have employed a more moderate and equally viable alternative, 
and that the need for mass transportation had been foreseeable at the 
outset of the agreement, changing only in degree and not in kind.157 
In short, the Contracts Clause will not prohibit government ac-
tions that impair public contract rights when the act is justified as rea-
sonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.15S When 
the government impairment is justified the private party is not enti-
tled to any relief.159 On the other hand, if the government impair-
ment is not justified, the court will issue an injunction prohibiting the 
municipality from enforcing the ordinance.160 
C. Adjudicative Takings: "Unconstitutional Conditions" 
1. Exactions Generally 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the gov-
ernment from taking private property for public use without paying 
just compensation.l61 The police power of the state, however, includes 
the authority to impose conditions and exactions on private develop-
ment. 162 An exaction comprises "an assortment of techniques em-
ployed by local authorities to compel a developer, either by regula-
tion, negotiation, or simple leverage, to exchange land, money, materials, 
or services for permission to develop. "163 The critical legal issue facing 
exactions generally is how far the municipality may go in imposing 
155 See id. at 32. 
156 See id. at 28-32. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at 25. 
159 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 976. 
160 See id. at 1037. For a discussion on the remedy for an u~ustified impairment of 
contract, see infra Part IV.E.2.c. 
161 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
162 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825, 843 (1987) (Brennan. J.. 
dissenting). 
163 Crew. supra note 1, at 23-24 (emphasis added). 
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such conditions without violating the Takings Clause.164 In Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme 
Court examined the constitutionality of exactions imposed as condi-
tions upon development permits.165 
a. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
In Nollan, the Nollans sought a development permit to replace 
their small beachfront home with a three-bedroom house.l66 The Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission granted the permit, subject to the condi-
tion that the Nollans dedicate a public access easement across a por-
tion of their property along the beach.167 The Commission justified 
the easement as necessary to alleviate the burdens caused by the pro-
posed development, namely the public's obstructed view of the beach 
and their subsequent difficulty in realizing that those portions of the 
beach were available for use.l68 The Nollans challenged the condition, 
claiming that it effected a taking of their private property for public 
use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.169 The Court agreed and held the condition un-
constitutional because it lacked an "essential nexus" to the burdens 
the new development would create.170 The permit condition, there-
fore, was "not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan 
of extortion'. "171 While the Nollan decision established the require-
ment of a nexus between the exaction imposed and the harm the de-
velopment will cause, the Supreme Court in Dolan set forth the neces-
sary "degree of connection between the exactions and the projected 
impact of the proposed development. "172 
b. Dolan v. City of Tigard 
In Dolan, Florence Dolan owned a plumbing and electrical supply 
store and applied to the city for a permit to redevelop the site.173 The 
City Planning Commission granted Dolan's permit application, sub-
164 See Curtin, supra note 44, at 221. 
165 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386--88 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-37. 
166 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. at 828-29. 
169 See id. at 829. 
170 See id. at 837-39. 
IiI Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (citation omitted). 
172 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386. 
173 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994). 
740 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:719 
ject to the conditions that she "dedicate the portion of her property 
lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm 
drainage system along Fanno Creek and that she dedicate an addi-
tional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedes-
trian/bicycle pathway."174 Dolan challenged the dedication require-
ments as an uncompensated taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments,l75 The Court held that although an "essential nexus" 
existed between the conditions imposed and the burdens that the de-
velopment would cause, the conditions were unconstitutional because 
they did not have a "rough proportionality" to the development's im-
pact. 176 Moreover, the Court distinguished other cases involving legisla-
tive determinations as to land use regulations from the present case 
where "the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's 
application for a building permit on an individual parcel. "177 
In sum, through the Nollan and Dolan decisions, the Supreme 
Court has placed a dual burden on municipalities imposing adjudica-
tive conditions: (1) the exaction must have an "essential nexus" to the 
burdens that the proposed development will cause; and (2) "rough 
proportionality" must exist between the exaction and the develop-
ment's impact.178 The important issue here is whether exactions im-
posed pursuant to development agreements are subject to the Nollan 
and Dolan requirements that apply generally to adjudicative condi-
tions.179 Resolution of this issue will turn upon "how willing the courts 
are to accept ... the ... 'voluntary'rationale."180 
2. Should Nollan and Dolan Apply to Exactions Imposed Pursuant to 
Development Agreements? 
Municipalities can obtain exactions through development 
agreements.l81 For example, a municipality may negotiate for the de-
veloper's promise to restrict the use of his property, to build public 
infrastructure, and to make cash payments, in exchange for the prom-
ise to vest development rights by freezing the applicable land use 
174 [d. at 379-80. 
175 See id. at 382. 
176 Seeid. at 386-88, 391-95 (emphasis added). 
177 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added). 
178 Seeid. at 391; NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
179 SeeCaHies, sUfn'a note 81, at 30. 
180 [d. at 31. 
181 SeeCrew, supra note 1, at 27. 
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regulations for a specific period.182 Assuming that development 
agreements are administrative acts, it appears that the Nollan and Do-
lan requirements should apply to prevent the type of "extortion" Nol-
Ian sought to eliminate.l83 The voluntary nature of the development 
agreement, however, suggests that developers ought to be bound by 
the agreed upon conditions, even if the conditions violate Nollan and 
Dolan.184 
If Nollan and Dolan apply, exactions imposed pursuant to a devel-
opment agreement must satisfy the "essential nexus" and "rough pro-
portionality" requirements in the same manner as traditional forms of 
exactions.l85 Thus, Nollan and Dolan arguably apply to all exactions, 
whether voluntary or involuntary.186 The reasoning here is to prevent 
the type of extortion that Nollan was designed to eliminate, as it is 
difficult to determine whether a developer truly accepted a condition 
voluntarily.l87 "[D]evelopers who depend on the affected projects for 
financial sustenance will often accede to, or even suggest, the unlaw-
ful exaction rather than face years of litigation and delay. "188 By apply-
ing the "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" requirements to 
development agreement conditions, the developer is protected from a 
municipality's abuse of its "regulatory leverage" in an adjudicatory 
setting, where the risk for such extortion-like abuse is inherently 
high.l89 
On the other hand, and equally deserving of consideration, is the 
view against applying Nollan and Dolan to development agreement 
exactions, thereby allowing municipalities to exact in excess of what 
ordinarily would be permitted.190 A municipality should arguably be 
able to exact as much as possible in return for vested rights as the 
182 See id. 
183 See id. at 52-53. For a discussion on the characterization of a development agree-
ment as an administrative act, see infra Part V.AA. Such characterization is important here, 
however, because the form of extortion condemned by the Nolliln court exists only in ad-
judicatory settings. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
184 See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir. 
1991); Crew, supra note 1, at 53. See id. 
185 See Callies, supra note 81, at 31-32; see also Crew, supra note 1, at 49, 53 (arguing 
that Nollan applies even where the developer has agreed to the condition). 
186 See Crew, supra note 1, at 49,53. 
187 See Callies, supra note 81, at 31; Crew, Sllpra note 1, at 52-53. 
188 Crew, supra note 1, at 38-39. 
189 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438-39 
(Cal. 1996); Crew, supra note 1, at 52-53; Curtin, supra note 44, at 231-35 (summarizing 
Ehrlich, 911 P.2d 429). 
190 See Callies, supra note 81, at 30-32. 
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formation of a development agreement is a voluntary contract, which 
neither the developer nor the municipality is compelled to execute.191 
As a general rule, the right to develop one's property is not a govern-
mental benefit, and therefore a municipality can condition its ap-
proval only by showing the reasonableness of the exaction.192 In a de-
velopment agreement, however, a municipality is not attaching 
exactions to the right to develop, but rather is promising to secure the 
developer's investment by not enforcing any subsequent changes in 
the zoning regulations that render the proposed use impermissible.193 
Thus, a development agreement may be seen as "convey[ing] a gov-
ernmental benefit upon the developer, since' [i] t is well established that 
there is no federal Constitutional right to be free from changes in 
land use laws."'194 A municipality, therefore, under this view, should 
not be limited by Nollan and Dolan; rather, it should be permitted to 
exact as much as the developer is willing to voluntarily concede in ex-
change for vested rights.I95 
In Meredith v. Talbot County, a land developer and a planning 
officer voluntarily entered into a development agreement, under 
which the developer received immediate subdivision plat approval in 
exchange for his promise not to develop lots serving as a habitat for 
two endangered species.196 The developer later attempted to invali-
date the agreement as a product of duress. 197 The court held that the 
development agreement bound the developer because he made a 
"reasonable and informed" business decision which conferred 
benefits upon all the parties.198 Significantly, the court stated that 
"[t]he fact that the decision was made in the face of likely adverse 
governmental action is of no consequence. "199 
Moreover, in Leroy Land Development v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, the developer wanted to rescind a settlement agreement with 
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency that required on-site and off-site 
191 See id. 
192 See Callies, supra note 81, at 32; Crew, supra note I, at 23. 
193 See Callies, supra note 81, at 32. 
194 [d. (quoting Lakeview Dev. v. South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 
1990) (emphasis added). 
195 See id. 
196 See Meredith v. Talbot County, 560 A.2d 599, 601-02 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). 
197 See id. at 603. 
198 See id. at 604. 
199 [d. 
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mItIgation measures.200 The court held that "[s]uch a contractual 
promise which operates to restrict a property owner's use of land 
cannot result in a 'taking' because the promise is entered into volun-
tarily, in good faith and is supported by consideration. "201 The court 
refused to apply the takings analysis formulated in Nollan because the 
parties chose to avoid litigation by executing a settlement agreement 
supported by consideration.202 
D. Legislative Act or Administrative Act? 
A legislative act focuses on broad questions of public policy, af-
fecting the population generally.203 The adoption of a comprehensive 
zoning ordinance or amendment, for example, is a legislative act. 204 
An administrative act, in contrast, applies general standards to the 
facts of a particular case.205 The approval or denial of a special or 
conditional use permit, for instance, is deemed an administrative 
act.206 
Whether the adoption of a development agreement is character-
ized as a legislative act or an administrative act is legally significant for 
a few reasons.207 First, where permitted by a state constitution, legisla-
tive decisions are subject to voter repeal through referendum while 
administrative decisions are not.208 Second, the heightened judicial 
scrutiny for due process violations under the Nollan and Dolan takings 
analysis applies to administrative acts, whereas the less onerous tak-
ings test formulated in Agins v. City of Tiburon applies to legislative 
acts.209 Finally, the Contracts Clause only protects administrative de-
terminations from a municipal impairment.210 
2QO See Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planing Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 
1991). Generally, a settlement agreement is the functional equivalent of a development 
agreement. 
201 Id. at 698. 
202 See id. at 698-99. 
203 See vVegner, supra note 57, at 1012. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
207 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 470-71; see generally, Wegner, supra note 55, at 1010-14 
(discussing the availability of referendum and initiative procedures). 
208 See Callies, supra note 81, at 22. 
209 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The application of a general zoning law to particular property ef-
fects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or 
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."). 
210 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 471. 
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E. Remedies for Noncompliance 
1. Developer Noncompliance with Exactions and Conditions 
A developer is required to comply with the exactions only if he 
proceeds with the project.21l Once development begins, and pursuant 
to the authorizing statute, noncompliance is detected through peri-
odic review of a development's progress.212 When noncompliance is 
discovered, the municipality may terminate or modify the agreement, 
as long as the noncompliance is not excused by specific terms of the 
agreement.213 Additional remedies available to the government for 
the developer's breach include "recourse to security devices ... and 
reliance on applicable enforcement measures established by local or-
dinance. "214 
2. Municipal Noncompliance with Regulatory Freeze Provisions 
a. Legislative Takings 
Once the right to develop vests through a development agree-
ment, the enactment of a new zoning ordinance which renders the 
approved development impermissible may effect a legislative tak-
ing.215 The Supreme Court in Agins declared that land use regulation 
becomes a taking if it (1) does not substantially advance a legitimate 
state interest, or (2) denies an owner economically viable use.216 In 
determining whether a regulation satisfies the second prong of the 
Agins test, courts generally look to the value in the owner's property as 
a whole rather than the value of the segment taken.217 An owner has 
the burden of showing that he has been deprived of "all economically 
beneficial" uses of his land.218 The critical factor to consider is the 
211 See River Vale Planning Bcl. v. E & R Office Interiors, Inc., 575 A.2d 55, 60 (NJ. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
212 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.1 (1997). 
213 See, e.g., id. ''Typically, they excuse noncompliance only when acts of God intervene 
or the state governor declares an emergency." Wegner, supra note 57, at 1 027-28. 
214 Wegner, supra note 57, at 1028. 
215 See id. at 1030-35. 
216 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
217 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-502 (1987); 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
218 See Lucas v. Southern Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (em-
phasis added). 
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regulation's interference with an owner's "investment-backed expec-
tations. "219 
If a legislative taking has occurred, the remedy varies depending 
on which prong of the Agins test has been violated and for how long 
the violation has occurred.220 If the inconsistent ordinance does not 
substantially advance a legitimate state interest, the ordinance will be 
invalidated but damages will not necessarily be awarded. 221 On the 
other hand, if the regulation denies an owner all economically viable 
use of his land, the ordinance may be invalidated or amended, and 
damages may be awarded for the "temporary taking" that occurs while 
the regulation is in effect prior to a court's takings determination.222 
A municipality, however, retains the right to exercise its power of emi-
nent domain and pay just compensation for its noncompliance with 
the freeze provision.223 
b. Breach of Contract 
An inconsistent zoning ordinance might also amount to a breach 
of contract.224 Common law remedies for breach of contract include 
damages, restitution, and specific performance.225 The award of dam-
ages is the "principal legal remedy" and the "common form of relief 
for breach of contract."226 Damages are measured by the landowner's 
"expectation interest," which is the "actual value that the contract 
would have had to the injured party had it been performed. "227 Resti-
tution requires that the party in breach "account for a benefit that has 
been conferred by the injured party. "228 To prevent "unjust enrich-
ment," the party in breach must return the benefit received or pay a 
219 See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124, 127 (1978) (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as the leading case discussing "investment-backed expecta-
tions"); Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 493-502. 
220 Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
221 [d. 
222 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304,313,321-22 (1987) (holding that the Just Compensation Clause requires the govern-
ment to pay for "temporary" regulatory takings); Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
223 See First English, 482 U.S. at 321 ("Once a court determines that a taking has oc-
curred, the government retains the whole range of options already available-amendment 
of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.") 
(emphasis added). 
224 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1035. 
225 See id. at 1035. 
226 FARNSWORTH, supra note 80, at 761,784. 
227 [d. at 756, 784. 
228 [d. at 851. 
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sum of money equivalent to its value.229 Specific performance is the 
"principal equitable remedy" for breach of contract, requiring "the 
promisor to render the promised performance."23o Importantly, nei-
ther legal nor equitable relief is available if governmental noncompli-
ance serves the public health, safety, or welfare. 231 
c. Impairment of Contract 
Finally, the enactment of a new zoning ordinance which renders 
the approved development impermissible will constitute an unconsti-
tutional impairment of contract if it cannot be justified as "reasonable 
and necessary."232 The remedy for an unjustified contractual impair-
ment is to issue an injunction prohibiting the municipality from en-
forcing the ordinance.233 In this manner, an injunction has the same 
effect as ordering specific performance of the contract.234 Although 
the Contracts Clause does not permit a court to award damages in-
stead of specific performance of the contract, "interim damages," 
similar to those awarded in the takings context, are arguably avail-
able. 235 Lastly, although an unconstitutional impairment of contract 
by definition prevents a municipality from being excused from its 
noncompliance on health, safety, or welfare grounds, a municipality 
may assert its power of eminent domain and pay just compensation 
for its impairment.236 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Applying the Legal Issues to Development Agreements 
As a threshold issue, a municipality must have express authority 
to enter into development agreements to avoid an agreement being 
declared void as ultra vires.237 Express authority is derived from a state 
enabling statute.238 Assuming that a municipality has the requisite 
authority, the development agreement may then face a reserved pow-
229 See id. 
230 [d. at 761, 770. 
231 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1035. 
232 See id. at 1036-37. 
233 See id. at 1037. 
234 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 80, at 770-71. 
235 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037,976 n.104. 
236 See id. at 1038. 
237 See Delaney, Development Agreements, supra note 8, at 55. 
238 See id. 
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ers doctrine challenge, as well as constitutional claims invoking the 
Contracts Clause and the Fifth Amendment Takings provision.239 Ad-
ditionally, whether the adoption of a development agreement is a leg-
islative act or an administrative act must be determined, and the rem-
edy issue must be resolved in the event ofnoncompliance.24o 
1. The Reserved Powers Doctrine 
Municipalities are not likely to violate the reserved powers doc-
trine upon entering into development agreements.241 While zoning 
represents an exercise of a municipality's police power, development 
agreements generally do not impermissibly contract away the zoning 
power-by its terms, a municipality retains some control over the 
agreement.242 For instance, a municipality may modify or terminate 
an agreement upon discovering developer noncompliance or if re-
quired by the public health, safety, or welfare, and certain agreements 
limit the duration of the regulatory freeze. 243 Further, rather than 
contracting away the police power, development agreements consti-
tute its reasonable exercise as they provide the required incentive for 
private investment in the planning process.244 Thus, in Giger v. City of 
Omaha, the appellants claimed that the city bargained away its police 
power when it entered into a development agreement.245 There, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court held: 
In sum, we find that there is not clear and satisfactory evi-
dence to support the appellants' contention that the city has 
bargained away its police power. The evidence clearly shows 
that the city's police powers are not abridged in any manner 
and that the agreement is expressly subject to the remedies 
available to the city under the Omaha Municipal Code. Fur-
ther, we find that the agreement actually enhances the city's 
239 See Callies, supra note 81, at 5, 10, 30. 
240 See id.; SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 86, at 498. 
241 See Callies, supra note 81, at 7, 9. 
242 See id. at 7. CompaTe Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 
724,734 (1976) (holding city did not surrender its control of sewer operations), and Giger 
v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Neb. 1989) (holding city's police powel's were not 
abridged in any manner), with City of Belleview v. Belleview Fire Fighters, Inc., 367 So. 2d 
1086, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding local government gave absolute control re-
garding fire fighting to a private corporation). 
243 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65865.1-.3 (1997). 
244 See Crew, supra note I, at 28 n.33; Kessler, supra note 7, at 468. 
245 Giger, 442 N.W.2d at 192. 
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regulatory control over the development rather than limit-
ing it.246 
Accordingly, development agreements are not likely to be found void 
ab initio in violation of the reserved powers doctrine-rather courts 
should readily declare them valid and enforceable contracts.247 
2. The Contracts Clause 
The enactment of a new zoning ordinance that impairs a valid 
development agreement amounts to a contractual impairment; it is 
not a mere breach of contract.248 An impairment exists because such 
government action makes it illegal or impossible for the defaulting 
party to fulfill its contractual obligation, thereby providing a sufficient 
defense and precluding an adequate remedy in damages.249 
Specifically, passing the new zoning ordinance makes it illegal or im-
possible for the defaulting municipality to implement the regulatory 
freeze, thereby giving itself a defense to a breach of contract action 
for damages.25o Moreover, protecting developers from new inconsis-
tent legislation advances the purpose of the Contracts Clause to pro-
216Id. 
247 See Callies, supra note 81, at 7, 9. 
248 SeeE. & E. Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 613 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, supra note 6, at 35-37 ("Subsequent legislative 
action seeking to amend, modifY, or repeal the development agreement would undoubt-
edly impair the obligation of contract .... "); Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036 (concluding 
that noncompliance with a regulatory freeze likely constitutes an impairment). 
2·19 SeeE. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679-81; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, 
supra note 6, at 35-37. 
250 See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679-81; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189; Kramer, 
supra note 6, at 35-37. It is beyond the scope of this Note to sufficiently explain why im-
plementing the regulatory freeze becomes illegal or impossible upon the enactment of a 
new zoning ordinance. Briefly, however, there are at least two possible explanations. The 
first theory stems from case law and recognizes that the government act of enacting a new 
zoning ordinance consists of passing a law. See E. & E. Hauling, 613 F.2d at 679-80 (explain-
ing the significance of the "[ulse of law" to prevent a party from fulfilling its contractual 
obligations). The law itself is something tlle municipality can point to when asserting a 
defense to a breach of contract action for damages. See id. Second, regarding the new zon-
ing ordinance as an impairment will serve the provisions of the state enabling statutes 
which allow exceptions to the regulatory freeze for laws, such as zoning amendments, 
which are arguably essential to the public health, safety, or welfare. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T 
CODE § 65865.3 (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-127 (1996). Treating the new zoning ordi-
nance as an impairment entitles it to survive the first prong of Contracts Clause analysis, 
and advance to the justification prong where it is determined whether the law is "reason-
able and necessary" to serve an important public purpose. See United States Trust Co. v. 
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,25 (1977). 
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mote confidence and stability in contractual obligations.251 This espe-
cially holds true in the context of development agreements as the leg-
islative findings and declarations in the statutes specifically provide 
that the purpose of entering into such agreements is to provide "cer-
tainty" and "assurance" in the development process.252 Thus, the cen-
tral issue becomes whether the contractual impairment is justified. 253 
Routine land use regulations are not likely to meet the "reason-
able and necessary" standard mandated by United States Trust.254 On 
balance, the degree of impairment of the developer's contractual ex-
pectations will usually outweigh a municipality's interest in the exer-
cise of its zoning power.255 Significantly, the developer is likely to heav-
ily and reasonably rely on his contractual expectations as he will often 
spend a large sum of money and perform substantial work in good 
faith reliance on the regulatory freeze. 256 The "reasonable and neces-
sary" strict scrutiny test can be satisfied, however, if a municipality 
shows that regulatory changes are the only way to address a public 
health or safety concern.257 Under such circumstances, the municipal-
ity's interest will outweigh the developer's contractual expectations.258 
To illustrate, consider two hypothetical zoning ordinances that 
may impair a valid development agreement. Both ordinances are pre-
sumptively treated as contractual impairments, and thus the key issue 
is whether the impairment is justified.259 Suppose one ordinance 
raises minimum lot size requirements from one unit per ten acres to 
one unit per twenty acres. Applying strict scrutiny, this ordinance 
would likely qualify as a routine land use regulation and the munici-
pality's interest in exercising its zoning power will not outweigh the 
developer's contractual expectations.260 As such, it probably fails the 
justification prong of Contracts Clause analysis and, as mentioned su-
pra during the discussion on remedies for noncompliance, the mu-
nicipality will be required to comply with the regulatory freeze. 261 A 
second and more improbable hypothetical is an ordinance that regu-
251 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 15; Hagman, supra note 137, at 189. 
252 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65864. 
253 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036. 
254 See id. at 1037. 
255 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28-32. 
256 SeeAllied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978). 
257 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037. 
256 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 28-32. 
259 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1036. 
260 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-32; Wegner, supm note 57, at 1037. 
261 See supra Part IV.E.2.c. 
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lates building heights in a zone that was just discovered to be suscep-
tible to earthquakes. Unlike the first law, this ordinance has a strong 
chance of surviving strict scrutiny if the regulation is the only way to 
respond to the earthquake concern, as then the municipality's inter-
est in public safety will outweigh the developer's contractual expecta-
tions.262 Thus, this second ordinance may be justified under the stan-
dard set forth in United States Tmst, thereby permitting the 
municipality to apply the new law.263 
The type of zoning ordinance likely to be passed after the execu-
tion of a valid development agreement will probably resemble the first 
hypothetical ordinance and amount to a routine land use regula-
tion.264 It is uncommon for an earthquake zone or a comparable pub-
lic safety threat to suddenly appear, and therefore zoning ordinances 
rarely embrace such importance without forewarning. Thus realizing 
that a new inconsistent zoning ordinance will probably qualify as a 
routine land use regulation, and recognizing that such regulations are 
not likely to meet the "reasonable and necessary" strict scrutiny stan-
dard, it is presumable that the enactment of a new zoning ordinance 
renders the approved development impermissible and constitutes an 
unjustifiable contractual impairment in violation of the Contracts 
Clause.265 The focus then turns to the appropriate remedy, and this 
issue will be addressed shortly.266 
3. Adjudicative Takings: "Unconstitutional Conditions" 
As entering into a development agreement is a voluntary act that 
conveys a governmental benefit upon the developer, a municipality 
should generally be able to bargain for exactions in exchange for 
vested rights free from the "essential nexus" and "rough proportional-
ity" limitations imposed by Nollan and Dolan.267 This view emphasizes 
the voluntary nature of the agreement and a basic principle of con-
tract law, in light of the policy underlying the Nollan and Dolan deci-
sions. "[T]he bargain test of consideration [has] shift[ed] the con-
cern of judges from the substance of the exchange to the bargaining 
process. "268 So long as the bargaining process is voluntary, it is of no 
262 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25-32; Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037. 
263 See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25; Wegner, supra note 57, at 976. 
264 SeeWegner, supra note 57, at 1037. 
265 See id. 
266 See infra Part V A.5. 
267 See Callies, supra note 81, at 32; SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 86, at 499. 
268 FARNSWORTH, supra note 80, at 69. 
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constitutional significance that a developer accedes to otherwise un-
lawful exactions.269 The bargaining process will likely be truly volun-
tary because the type of developer who negotiates with a municipality 
to execute a development agreement is probably in the business of 
large-scale development and, at the very least, can afford adequate 
legal representation; a municipality is unlikely to bargain with an in-
experienced developer. Accordingly, the policy underlying Nollan and 
Dolan to prevent extortion in an adjudicatory setting is inapplicable as 
the developer is capable of making a reasonable and informed busi-
ness decision.270 The protective "essential nexus" and "rough propor-
tionality" limitations should apply, however, when the developer is in-
experienced because under these circumstances a municipality is 
primed to take advantage of its regulatory leverage.271 Moreover, ena-
bling ordinances passed by municipalities that define negotiation 
standards suffice to protect developers from abuse by ensuring that 
exactions negotiated through development agreements are not arbi-
trary and capricious.272 In sum, a municipality should generally be 
able to exact conditions from the developer in excess of the Nollan 
and Dolan limitations because the voluntary bargaining process does 
not implicate the policy concern of preventing extortion.273 
4. Legislative Act or Administrative Act? 
The adoption of a development agreement should be considered 
an administrative act and therefore not subject to referendum.274 A 
development agreement usually affects a single parcel or a small 
number of parcels of land, binds specific parties, and includes precise 
substantive findings concerning the permitted uses of the property, 
exactions and related conditions, as well as the duration of the 
agreement. 275 Additionally, development agreements contain proce-
dural requirements such as public hearings and notice. 276 Considered 
together, these characteristics suggest that development agreements 
269 See Callies, supra note 81, at 30. 
270 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Meredith v. Tal-
bot County, 560 A.2d 599, 604 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). 
271 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Ehr-
lich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438-39 (Cal. 1996). 
272 See Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater, 541 A.2d 1105, 1110 (NJ. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1988). 
273 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Callies, supra note 81, at 30-32. 
274 See Callies, supra note 81, at 22. 
275 See Wegner, supra note 57, at 1013. 
276 See id. 
752 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:719 
are the products of administrative acts as opposed to legislative acts 
because they do not involve broad questions of public policy that af-
fect the population generally.277 
5. Remedies for Noncompliance 
Periodic review of development progress will detect developer 
noncompliance, at which point the municipality may terminate or 
modify the agreement.278 Municipal noncompliance, on the other 
hand, "raises questions involving the constitutional taking and im-
pairment of contract doctrines, as well as common-law contract 
law. "279 As previously stated, the enactment of a new zoning ordinance 
which renders the approved development impermissible amounts to a 
contractual impairment; it is not a mere breach of contract.280 Accord-
ingly, breach of contract damages are not available. Moreover, a new 
inconsistent zoning ordinance is not likely to be justified as "reason-
able and necessary" to serve an important public purpose.281 Thus, 
municipal noncompliance in this instance amounts to an unconstitu-
tional impairment of contract, as well as a legislative taking by virtue 
of violating the first prong of the Agins test.282 The question then be-
comes, under which cause of action should a developer proceed: im-
pairment of contract or regulatory taking? 
In the event of municipal noncompliance, a developer should 
seek recovery under an impairment of contract theory because that 
doctrine provides the best opportunity to recover damages. 283 A new 
inconsistent zoning ordinance will be invalidated under both impair-
ment of contract and regulatory taking theories, thereby ensuring 
that the development agreement will be performed.284 However, as 
damages are not necessarily awarded for takings when the inconsis-
277 See id. at lO12. 
278 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.1 (1997). 
279 Wegner, supra note 57, at lO29-30. 
280 See id. at 1036. 
281 See id. at 1037. 
282 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating first prong is whether 
law substantially advances legitimate state interests); Wegner, supra note 57, at 1037. Im-
portantly, the second prong of Agins is not violated as a new inconsistent zoning ordinance 
does not deprive an owner of all economically beneficial uses of his land; it merely prohib-
its the presently desired development. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. Recall that damages may 
be awarded for a violation of prong two of Agins, but are not necessarily awarded for a 
violation of prong one. Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
283 Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
284 See Wegner, supra note 57, at lO37; Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
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tent ordinance does not substantially advance a legitimate state inter-
est, it is clear that a developer's best opportunity to recover damages is 
to seek "interim damages" under impairment of contract theory.285 
B. Development Agreements Useful in Early Vt?sting States 
Undoubtedly, development agreements are advantageous to de-
velopers in late vesting states as they circumvent the ordinary devel-
opment process and provide vested rights prior to the issuance of a 
building permit.286 Development agreements are less beneficial in 
early vesting states because state law already codifies their main advan-
tages. 287 That is, the right to develop vests early in the development 
process, usually once a certain type of discretionary permit has been 
approved.288 In Massachusetts, for instance, vested rights may be ob-
tained by receiving a special permit or submitting a definitive or pre-
liminary subdivision plan to a planning board.289 
Nevertheless, development agreements can provide advantages to 
developers and municipalities in early vesting states.290 Similar to de-
velopers in late vesting states, developers in early vesting states are 
concerned with more than just freezing the existing zoning regula-
tions as they too must receive various permits regarding issues such as 
health and safety.291 Thus, like developers in late vesting states, devel-
opers in early vesting states can use development agreements to bar-
gain for a streamlined regulatory review process.292 In addition, de-
velopment agreements may be useful to extend the time limitations 
often attached to special permits and subdivision plan approvals.293 
For example, in Massachusetts, a special permit must conform to sub-
sequent zoning changes unless construction begins within six months 
after the issuance of the permit, while subdivision plans receive an 
eight year grace period following approva1.294 A developer in an early 
vesting state such as Massachusetts can bargain for an extension of the 
permissible time period for project completion.295 The municipality 
285 Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
286 See Crew, supra note 1, at 31; Kessler, supra note 7, at 452. 
287 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 455. 
288 See id. at 454. 
289 See MASS. GEN. LAWS eh. 40A, § 6 (1994). 
290 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 455. 
291 Witten Interview, supra note 1. 
292 See MODEL DEV. AGREEMENT BYLAW § 06.0. 
293 See MODEL DEV. AGREEMENT BYLAW § 06.0; Kessler, supra note 7, at 455. 
294 See MASS. GEN. LAWS eh. 40A, § 6. 
295 See Kessler, supra note 7, at 455. 
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will receive the customary public benefits such as parks, roads, or 
land, as well as assurance that development will proceed in a timely 
fashion. 296 
CONCLUSION 
Development agreements are attractive solutions to the uncer-
tainty and risk inherent in the development process. In late vesting 
states, they provide developers with vested rights earlier in the devel-
opment process, where ordinarily a developer would not receive a 
vested right until the building permit is issued. As such, development 
agreements protect developers' investments from subsequent changes 
in zoning regulations which render proposed uses impermissible. In 
early vesting states, development agreements afford developers in-
creased certainty in regard to the regulatory permitting process, and 
allow developers to extend the time period within which their project 
can be built-out. In exchange for vested rights and other assurances, 
municipalities are able to exact public benefits and achieve adequate 
comprehensive planning. 
Development agreements are readily enforceable. Typically, states 
expressly delegate the power to enter into development agreements 
to municipalities through enabling legislation. Municipalities are not 
likely to violate the reserved powers doctrine upon entering into de-
velopment agreements because municipalities retain some control 
over the agreements. The enactment of a new zoning ordinance in-
consistent with the terms of a development agreement presumably 
amounts to a contractual impairment in violation of the Contracts 
Clause. Significantly, the contractual impairment will likely resemble a 
routine land use regulation that cannot be justified as "reasonable 
and necessary" to serve an important public purpose, thus entitling 
the developer to a remedy. Moreover, in light of the voluntary bar-
gaining process, municipalities are able to exact public benefits in ex-
cess of what would otherwise be allowed by the regulatory takings 
rules. Further, development agreements should be characterized as 
administrative acts and not, therefore, subject to voter repeal through 
referendum. Finally, in the event of municipal noncompliance, a de-
veloper should seek recovery under impairment of contract theory 
because while both impairment of contract and regulatory taking 
doctrines invalidate the inconsistent ordinance and effectively require 
296 See id. 
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the agreement to be performed, impairment of contract theory pro-
vides the developer with the best opportunity to recover damages. 
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